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The Contribution of Mood and Force in the Interpretation of 
Imperatives· 
Chung-hye Han 
University of Pennsylvania 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to present a way of interpreting imperatives, where 
the term IMPERATIVE refers to sentences that have distinctive imperative morphology 
on the main verb. Our main proposal is that the directive illocutionary force of 
imperatives is not the result of Gricean reasoning or inference, but is directly encoded 
in their logical form, and that Gricean reasoning plays a role in the variability of 
directive force. We define directive force as a function that takes a certain type of 
proposition and turns it into a DIRECTIVE ACTION, which we in turn define as an 
instruction to the hearer to update his or her PLAN SET. A plan set is a set of 
propositions that specify the hearer's intentions, and it represents the state of affairs 
that the hearer intends to bring about. We will show that these definitions yield 
interesting linguistic results. 
This paper is organized as follows. In §2, we observe that across languages 
imperatives cannot be embedded and that in clauses embedded under directive verbs 
many languages use subjunctives or infinitivals. We discuss the implications of this for 
the proper characterization of the logical form of imperatives. In §3, we propose that 
the logical form of imperatives contains two components: one component encodes di-
rective force, and the other encodes the irrealis modality contributing the information 
that the situation described by the imperative is unrealized. We also propose a way 
of interpreting the two components. In §4. we suggest an extension of our proposal 
for imperatives to interrogatives. In §5, we discuss how our proposal explains some 
of the interpretative aspects of imperatives, in particular the interaction of directive 
force and nega tion. 
'1 thank Tony Kroch and Robin Clark for many v-d.!uable discu!Il!ions on this topic. 1 also thank 
Tonia Bleam, Maribeal Romero, Bf'.atrice Salltorini, and A1exander Williams for helpful comments 
on various versions of this paper. All errors are mine. 
@1999 by Chung-hye Han 
Pius Tarnanji, Masako Hirotani, and Nancy Hall (eds.), NELS 29: 97-111 
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2. No Embedded Imperatives 
All matrix sentences are associated with a canonical illocutionary force. The 
canonical illocutionary force expressed by declaratives is assertive force, and the 
canonical illocutionary force expressed by interrogatives is question force. But when 
the same sentence is embedded, it loses its canonical force. For instance, a matrix 
declarative ceases to be an assertion when embedded, as attested in (1). Similarly, a 
matrix interrogative ceases to be a question whell it is embedded, as attested in (2).1 
(1) a. John is intelligent. 
b. Mary thinks that .John is intelligent. 
(2) a. Is John intelligent? 
b. I don't know whether John is intelligent. 
A standard way of defining the semantics of declaratives and interrogatives 
is by identifying their semantics with that of the corresponding embedded clause. 
The main motivation for this approach is to allow a compositional semantics. Under 
this view, a declarative denotes a propositi OIl which is a set of worlds in which that 
proposition is true, and an interrogative denotes a set of possible answers which can 
be thought of as a partition on the set of possible worlds (see Karttunen (1977), Groe-
nendijk and Stokhof (1985)). Given this approach, the illocutionary forces expressed 
in matrix contexts are explained as the result of pragmatic inference or reasoning. 
Although this approach has been quite successful in the domain of interrog-
atives and declaratives, extending it to imperatives is not straightforward. This is 
because imperatives differ from declaratives and interrogatives in that langua~es do 
not seem to allow imperatives to be embedded (as noted by Sadock and Zwicky (1985) 
and Palmer (1986)). Many languages use subjunctives or infinitivals in clauses em-
bedded under directive verbs. 
(3) English 
a. * I demand that give me the book. 
b. I order you to give me the book. 
c. I demand that you give me the book. 
(4) :Wodern Greek 
a. * 0 Yannis se dietakse gra.pse. 
the Yannis you ordered-2sg write-2sg.hnp 
'Yannis ordered you to write. ' 
b. 0 Yannis se dietakse na grapsis. 
the Yannis you ordered-2nd.sg NA write-2sg.Subj 
'Yannis ordered you to write.' 
I Sentences can also be associated with non-canonical Ulocutionary force. For instance, a declar-
ative I am thir.ty can have the force of requesting for water, and an interrogative W7to care.? can 
have tbe force of asserting that nobody cares. It seems that non-canonical force can be expressed 
by embedded claUBeB. For examples, I regret to inform you that your .eroic", will no longer be 
required has tbe force of firing someone, and this force is coming from tbe embedded that-clause. 
Surely, non-canonical iIlocutionary force Is generated through Gricean inference. More discussion on 
non-canonical iIlocutionary force will be given in §3.3. 
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(5) Spanish 
a. * Pido que habla-Ie. 
ask that talk-2sg.Imp-her/him 
'I ask that you talk to her/him.' 
b. Pido que Ie hables. 
(6) Italian 
ask that her/him talk-2sg.Subj 
'I ask that you talk to her/him.' 
a. * Ti ordino che fallo. 
you order that do-2sg.lmp-it 
'I order you to do it.' 
h. Ti ordino che 10 faccia. 
you order that it do-2sg.8ubj 
'I order you to do it.' 
(7) French 
a. * J'exige que tu fiuis. 
I-require that you finish-2sg.lmp 
'I require that you finish.' 
b. J'exige que tu finisses. 
I-require that you finish-2sg.Subj 
'I require that you finish.' 
(8) German 
a. * Hans empfiehlt, daB Du nicht zu aufdringlich sei. 
Hans suggests that you not too pushy be-2sg.Imp 
'Hans suggests that you not be too pushy.' 
b. Hans empfiehlt, daB Du nicht zu aufdringlich seist. 
Hans suggests that you not too pushy be-2sg.Subj 
'Hans suggests that you not be too pushy.' 
The fact that languages do not have embedded imperatives and that it is 
matrix clauses that express canonical illocutionary force leads us to believe that the 
imperatives have an operator that encodes illocutionary force. Moreover1 we take the fact that languages use subjunctives or infinitivals in clauses embedded under 
directive verbs as an indication that the propositional type denoted by imperatives is 
the same as that denoted by subjunctives or infinitivals. In effect, composing a force-
indicating operator with a proposition that has the same denotation as subjunctives 
or infinitivals derives an imperative interpretation. 
3. Logical Form of Imperatives 
3.1. Force in the Logical Form 
Frege viewed truth as the key concept of the theory of meaning; but he was 
also aware that understanding the meaning of a sentence involves more than just 
3
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knowing its truth conditions (Frege (1960)). He took sentences to be complexes of 
two components: a component that expresses its thought (sense), and a component 
th~t expresses its force, where to know the sense of a sentence is to know under what 
conditions it is true, and to know the force of a sentence is to know the conventions of 
its use in discourse. According to Frege, there are linguistic expressions which serve 
as force-indicators of a sentence, playing the part of an assertion sign, a question sign, 
or a command si/Pl. Thus, in addition to the signs for sentential operators such as 
negation and conjunction that contribute to the sense of the sentence, he proposed 
that signs for force-indicating expressions are also necessary. 
Lewis (1976) expresses a similar opinion. According to Lewis (1976), a sentence 
should be divided into two components: the sentence radical and the mood. The 
sentence radical specifies a state of affairs, and the mood determines whether the 
speaker is declaring that the state of affairs holds, commanding that it hold, or 
asking whether it holds. Lewis's use of the term 'mood' corresponds to our use of 
'force.' Lewis represents a sentence as in (9). S is the category for sentence radicals, 
and the Mood category can be instantiated by either declarative (dec), imperative 
(imp) or interrogative (int). Thus, force-indicating symbols are part of the syntax of 
a sentence. 
(9) Sentence 
~, 
Mood S 
I {dec, imp, int} 
According to Lewis, sentence radicals have truth-values as extensions, and functions 
from possible worlds to truth-values as intensions. The entire apparatus of model-
theoretic semantics pertains to sentence radicals and constituents thereof. The se-
mantics of force is something entirely different. It interacts with rules of language use 
in discourse. 
We believe that the facts observed in §2 indeed show that the imperative 
directly encodes the information that it has directive force. We represent this infor-
mation with a force-indicating operator in the logical form' of imperatives, where the 
logical form is the output of syntax and the input to interpretation. Moreover, we pro-
pose that this force-indicating operator takes the propositional type of subjunctives 
or infinitivals, which we represent as irrealis(p). The term irrealis is intended to 
capture the fact that 5ubjlmctives and infinitivafs in general denote unreali>:ed hypo-
thetical situations (see Stowell (1982), Portner (1992), Farkas (1991), Quer (1998)).2 
We represent the logical form of imperatives as in (10). 
(10) Logical form of imperatives: 
directive( irrealis(p)) 
In this logical form, directive corresponds to the force-indicating operator, and 
irreal is(p) corresponds to the sentence radical that expresses the sense and inten-
sion of Frege and Lewis. We can say that irrealis(p) denotes a set of hypothetical 
possible worlds in which p is satisfied. Further, the speaker is agnostic as to whether 
'In the literature, it has been pointed out thnt not all subjunctives and infinitival. are used in 
irrealis contexts, raising doubt as to tbe appropriateness of the term ilTealis to classify the proper 
sitional type denoted by subjunctives and infinitivals. However, what is crucial for us is that the 
proposition associated with imperatives indeed express an unrealized situation. Hence, we believe 
that the term irrealis w:ill suffice for the purposes of this paper. 
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the real world is included in this set of possible worlds. In other words, as far as 
the speaker is concerned, it is possible for the real world to be included in this set 
but s/he does not know whether it is. In general, the set of possible worlds denoted 
by irrealis(v) is restricted to future-oriented possible worlds due to the meaning of 
directive. 1'he interpretation of directive will be discussed in §3.2. 
Our proposal for the logical form of imperatives differs from the approach 
that imperatives merely denote a certain type of proposition. Bolinger (1977) argues 
that imperatives are a type of bare infinitival that denotes hypothetical situations. 
Huntley (1984) and Davies (1986) argue that imperatives denote propositions that 
specify potential situations. Wilson and Sperber (1988) argue that imperatives de-
note propositions that specify possible and desirable situationshwhere the situation is 
either desirable to the speaker or the hearer. According to all t ese studies, the dir.ec-
tive illocutionary force expressed by imperatives is the result of pragmatic reasonmg 
and inference based on discourse contexts. However, if imperatives simply denote a 
certain type of proposition, the fact that they cannot be embedded remains myste-
rious. Further, under the pragmatic approach, it is unclear why 50 many languages 
have special morphosyntactic forms for thel expression of directives. Our approach 
provides a straightforward explanation for the fact that imperatives cannot be em-
bedded: the logical form of imperatives includes an operator that expresses directive 
illocutionary force, and since embedded clauses do not express canonical illocutionary 
forces, imperatives cannot be embedded. Moreover, under our approach, imperatives 
are grammatically specified to express directive force, whereas reasoning and infer-
ence playa role in explaining the variability of directive forces that can be expressed 
by imperatives. 
3.2. Directive Force 
Now we need to define what directive means in the proposed logical form for 
imperatives in (lO). In effect, direL'i.ive is responsible for expressing directive force, 
thereby making a sentence into a directive speech act such as commanding, ordering, 
or requesting. As first articulated in detail in Austin (1962) and systematically ex-
plored in Searle (1969, 1976), sentencffi are not used just to say things, but rather 
actively to do things. The action performed by uttering a sentence is called a SPEECH 
ACT. We will refer to directive speech act as DlRECT1VE ACTJON. 
We take the position that traditional truth-conditional semantics is not ex-
pressive enough to model the meaning of illocutionary force and the corresponding 
speech act. We believe that an appropriate way of defining directive action is to use 
the concept of lNSTRUCTION. We propose that by performing a directive action, the 
speaker instructs the hearer to update a particular module which we call the PLAN 
SET. A hearer's plan set is a set of propositions that specifies his or her intentions to 
bring about a certain state of affairs. Thus, an imperative, directive(irrealis(p)), is 
an instruction to the hearer to add p to his or her plan set. The notion of plan pre-
supposes that the planner has the ability to carry out the plan. In imperatives, since 
the speaker is instructing the hearer to update the plan set, the hearer is, in effect, 
the planner. Hence, issuing this instruction implies that the speaker believes that the 
hearer has the ability to bring about p. IT the hearer updates the plan set with p, 
then the hearer intends to bring about the situation described by p. Moreover, a plan 
is a future-oriented notion: if you are planning to bring about the situation described 
by p, then the situation is 1I0t realized at the time that p is planned and it can be 
reali7.ed in the future. Thus, it makes sense for directive to take irrealis(p) as its 
argument because the future-orientation of directive is compatible with the modality 
of unrealized contributed by irrealis. Further, if the speaker tells the hearer to plan 
to bring about the situation described by p, the implication is that the speaker wants 
the situatioll described by p to be realized. 
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3.3. Variability in the IIlocutionary Force of Imperatives 
Given our definition of directive force and directive action, an imperative 
canonically expresses such directives as order, command, or request. 
(11) Order, command 
a. Stand at ease! (a commander in the army to his soldiers) 
b. Take down this poem. (a teacher to her class) 
c. Clean that mess up at once! (a mother to her child) 
(12) Request 
a. Please bring me some water. 
b. Open the window, would you please? 
But imperatives can also express illocutionary forces that do not seem to 
be straightforwardly directives, such as permissions, wishes, threats and dares. For 
instance, in a context in which someone knocks on your door and you reply by uttering 
Come in, you are not usually ordering or requesting the knocker to come in, but rather 
giving him or her the permission to do so. 
Sentences in general can be used to perform INDIRECT SPEECH ACTS. For 
instance, although interrogatives canonically perform the speecll act of requesting 
information, they can also perform the indirect speech act of requesting action. For 
instance, Can you open the window? has the literal force of a question requesting in-
formation as to whether the hearer has the ability to open the window, but it can also 
have an indirect force of a request to open the window. We argue that imperatives, 
just like other sentence types, can also be used to perfonn indirect speech acts, and 
we adopt the approach that sentences can be used this way by virtue of conversational 
implicatures arising from Gricean inference in certain discourse contexts (see Gordon 
and Lakoff (1971), Grice (1975), Searle (1975)). Since the description ofthe inference 
process is beyond the scope of this work, here we only make some brief and informal 
remarks. 
In a context in which a person A has expressed the desire and intention to 
perform p, the implication is that A already has p in her plan set. For instance, if A 
knocks on your door, then A is expressing her desire and intention to come in. That 
is, by knocking on your door, A is implying that her plan is to come in. By uttering 
Come in! in this context, you are acknowledging A's plan, rather than instructing 
A to update her plan set. It may be that if an imperative directive(irrealis(p)) is 
uttered in a context in which it is already known that the hearer has p in the plan 
set, then it performs the speech act of permission as an indirect speech act. 
An imperative such as Have a nice day! expresses a wish in general. A person 
does not usually have a control over having a nice day. She may have the desire and 
intention ofha'l';ng a nice day, but bringing about tbis state of affairs is not completely 
up to her. It will depend on events that are not always under her control. It may be 
that an imperative directive(irrealis(p)) can be used to perform the speech act of 
wishing as an indirect speech act if it is known that the hearer does not have control 
over realizing p. 
Imperatives that have the force of threats or dares express the opposite of what 
they literally mean. For instance, the second imperative in the sequence Go ahead. 
Hit me. Then you'll be sorry! is actually expressing that the speaker is warning the 
hearer not to hit him or her. This is not specific to imperatives. Declaratives can 
also express the oppOSite of their literal meaning when they are used ironically or 
sarcastically. In (13), what B is actually saying is that Clinton is not smart. 
6
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(13) a. A: Clinton messed up again. 
b. B: Yeah, he is really smart. (sarcastic) 
Imperatives that express threats and dares are comparable to declaratives that express 
irony and sarcasm. Just as we would not want to complicate the literal meaning of 
declaratives to handle the latter, we would not want to complicate the literal meaning 
of imperatives to handle the former. Instead, they should be handled by Gricean 
reasoning and inference. 
4. Extension to Interrogatives 
We have proposed that the imperatives have an operator which directly en-
codes directive force in their logical forms. If imperatives involve an operator that en-
codes iJlocutionary forces, other sentence types, most obviously interrogatives, should 
contain a relevant operator as well, namely an operator that encodes question force. 
At least in English, interrogatives in matrix contexts exhibit subject-verb in-
version. whereas indirect questions in embedded contexts do not. This may be an 
indication of the presence or absence of a question force-indicating operator. There 
are also other facts that indicate the presence of a force-indicating operator in matrix 
interrogatives. A negative yes-71O question in which both the negation and the verb 
are in Co as a unit and a negative yes-no question in which the negation is lower 
in the clause have different interpretational effects. The intuition is that the former 
implies that the speaker is asking whether p holds, and the latter implies that the 
speaker is asking whether ..,p holds. For instance, the question in (14a) asks whether 
John is intelligent and the question in (14b) asks whether John is not intelligent. 
(14) a. 
b. 
Isn't John intelligent? 
Is John not intelligent? 
This fact is puzzling given any semantics of yell-no questions. since both the ques-
tions in (14) have the same truth-conditional denotation. For instance, accorcling to 
Karttunen/Hamblin's semantics of questions. a question denotes a set of propositions 
that constitute possible answers in a given world of evaluation. And this set is the 
same for both of the questions in (14) . According to Groenendijk and Stokhof (1982) , 
a question denotes a proposition that constitutes a true exhaustive answer in a given 
world of evaluation. And this proposition is the same for both of the questions in 
(14). Groenendijk and Stokhof (1985) show that the semantics of questions given in 
Groenendijk and Stokhof (1982) is equivalent to a partition on the set of possible 
worlds where each equivalence class represents a possible answer. And both ques-
tions in (14) return the same partition where one of the equivalence class represents 
an affirmative answer and the other a negative answer.3 
' More formally. the denotation of ,questions in (14) translate into (Ia) according to Kart-
t unen (1977) . and (lb) according to Groenendljk and Stokhof (1982) . 
(I) [~(JQhnisinlelligent)7J 
a. Ap [P(w) /I II' = AW' (John is intelligent)(w' ) V p = AW'~(John is intelllgent)(w' )lJ 
(Karttunen semantics) . 
b. AU;' [~(John is intelligent)(w) = ~(John is intelligent)(w')] 
(Groellelldijk ali(I Stokhof semantics) 
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If we posit the presence of an interrogative operator in Co that encodes question 
force, we mav have a partial explanation as to the interpretational asymmetry between 
(14a) and (i4b). We can say that even though the two questions have the same 
truth-conditional denotation, they have different implications due to the difference 
in the way negation and the interrogative operator interact depending on where the 
negation is located with respect to the interrogative operator. That is, when negation 
endfi up in Co, where the interrogative operator is, the negation interacts with the 
interrogative operator to generate the interpretational effects described above. On the 
other hand, when negation is lower in the clause in interrogatives, it does not interact 
with the interrogative operator in Co, and 50 these interpretational effects are absent. 
However, further study is required to determine the exact nature of the interaction 
between negation and the interrogative operator and its effects on interpretation. 
Without further argument, we assume that interrogatives have an interrogative 
operator that encodes question force in their logical forms, and we define question 
force in terms of the instruction concept. As in Groenendijk and Stokhof (1985), we 
assume that a question 'p?' denotes a partition that represents the set of possible 
allswers: namely the positive answer p and the negative answer ..,p. Given this, 
simplifying matters a bit, we suggest that the question force is an instruction to the 
hearer to retrieve the proposition that represents the true answer (hased on her beliefs 
about the state of affairs) from the partition and plan to notify the speaker of the 
proposition that has been retrieved. Thus, if p is retrieved from the partition, then 
the hearer is instructed to update his or her plan set with a proposition I tell the 
speaker p. 
5. Explaining Some Interpretational Aspects of Imperatives 
5.1. Issuer of the Directive 
The meaning of directive force in the logical form of imperatives encodes that 
it is the speaker who issues the directive. The prediction is that as a reply to au 
imperative, a question as to who issued the directive should never come up. But the 
felicity of the interaction in (15) seems to contradict this prediction. 
(15) a. A: Leave! 
b. B: Who says 50? 
On a closer look, what B is asking is not who issued the directive, but who is re-
sponsible for A's issuing the directive. B may also be asking whether the speaker 
has the authority to issue the directive. The question in (15b) has these interpre-
tations exactly because the imperative operator encodes that tile speaker issues the 
directive.4 
5.2. Target of the Directive 
In imperatives, the speaker issues the directive to an addressee (or addrE'.~sees). 
This is clearly so in cases where imperatives have overt 2nd person subjects, or empty 
subjects that are understood to be 2nd person .. <\.0 apparent counterexample to this 
generalization is the fact that imperatives can have 3rd person subject NPs in English. 
4The original issuer of a directive expressed by an imperative may not be the speaker. For 
instance, in a military context, a lieutenant can issue an order in the form of an imperative which 
was originally issued by a colonel. Although the lieutenant, who is the speaker, is not the original 
issuer of the order, slhe is still issuing an order by way of transmitting the colonel's order. 
8
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(16) a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
Interpretation of Imperatives 
Nobody move. 
Everybody get out as quick as be/you can. 
Somebody pay the bill. 
The boy in the corner stand up. 
However, on a closer look, as pointed out by Stockwell et aI. (1973), even in the 
imperatives in (16), the subject referent is in some sense being addressed by the 
speaker. Evidence that the subjects in imperatives are being addressed by the speaker 
comes from examples like the following. The examples in (17) show that the subject in 
the tag question must be in the 2nd person, even though the subject in the preceding 
imperative is in the 3rd person. The examples in (18) show that the 3rd person 
subjects of imperatives are anaphorically related to a 2nd person pronoun in the 
subsequent sentences. 
(17) a. * The boy in the corner stand up, will he? 
b. The boy in the comer stand up, will you? 
(18) a. NobodYi move. I am begging youi!*himi/*themj. 
b. SomebodYi pay the bill. I am begging youi/*him;/*themi ' 
This property is captured by the proposal that the directive force encodes the infor-
mation that the speaker issues the directive to the addressee. 
5.3. Future Orientation 
Imperatives in general have future orientation. This can be shown by the fact 
that imperatives are compatible with future oriented adverbials, but not with past 
oriented adverbials. 
(19) a. Finish your homework tomorrow. 
b. * Finish your homework yesterday. 
In addition, even ad ... ·erbs that are not necessarily future-oriented can only be future-
oriented in imperatives. For instance, now and tonight can occur in linguistic contexts 
that are not future-oriented, as shown in (20). In fact, tonight can even be past-
oriented, as in (20b). 
(20) a. John is eating now. 
b. John finished his homework tonight. 
But when now and tonight occur in imperatives, they can only be future-oriented. In 
particular, now in (22) means something similar to from now on. 
(21) a. 
b. 
(22) a. 
b. 
Behave yourself when the g11ests arrive tonight. 
Finish your homework tonight. 
Behave yourself now. 
Finish your homework now. 
9
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Moreover, as observed by Katz and Postal (1964), tag questions that follow 
imperatives are most natural with auxiliary will, providing support for future orien-
tation of imperatives. 
(23) a. Behave yourself, will you? 
b. Behave yourself, won't you? 
Bolinger (1977) argues that auxiliary will in tags following imperatives does not refer 
to futurity, but rather to willingness, and that the tag will you is paraphrasable as 
are you williTig to. Even so, if you are willing to do p, you do p in the future. Hence, 
the futurity of will remains. 
The future orientation of imperatives is captured by our proposal that the 10S-
ical form of imperatives encodes future.Qrientation. That is. in diredive(irrealis(p»), 
the meaning of directive encodes future-orientation, thereby restricting the denota-
tion of (irrealis(p)) to the set of future-oriented possible worlds. 
hnperatives, however, can also refer to the present, as noted by Bolinger (1977). 
(24) a. Please, be thinking about me. 
b. (Holding a lottery ticket, a person utters the following imperative) 
Please be the right number. 
Bolinger also claims that imperatives can refer to past events and provides the exam-
ples in (25) as supporting evidence. 
(25) a. Don't have three-fourths of the whiskey drunk already. 
b. Please, do have made that call by six 0' clock. 
However, these examples actually refer to the present state as indicated by the use of 
present perfect. Imperatives can refer to the present when they express the speaker's 
wish. The examples in (24) and (25) express the speaker's wish concerning the present, 
and they can be felicitously used only if the speaker does not know whether the 
situation described by the imperative has been realized or not. We have already 
pointed out that imperatives can be used to express a wish as an indirect speech 
act. In this case, the denotation of (irrealis(p» is not restricted to the set of future-
oriented possible worlds. It can denote a set of possible worlds that describe what 
the current state might be like. 
5.4. Negation and Directive Force 
The directive force contributed by the imperative operator cannot be negated. 
In a negative imperative, negation does not have scope over the directive force. 
Rather, the directive force always has scope over the negation. We illustrate this 
point in (26). 
(26) Don't go. 
:=:;, It is required that you not go. 
;;6 It is 110t required that you go. 
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In the logical form of imperatives that we have proposed, directive(irrealis(p», 
directive takes (irrealis(p)) as its argument. We have proposed that directive is a 
function that instructs the hearer to update his or her plan set with the proposition p. 
In effect, it is a non-truth-conditional operator that returns a non-truth-conditional 
object. On the other hand, negation is a truth-conditional operator that operates on 
a proposition and returns a proposition. Thus, it is impossible for negation to operate 
on iIlocutionary forces. 
According to Dummett (1973), Frege asserted that a sign for illocutionary force 
cannot meaningtully occur within tlie scope of sentential operators such as negation, 
but can attach only to a complete sentence as a whole. However, Dummett argues 
that ilIocutionary force signs can be negated and provides as evidence what he believes 
to be natural language expressions with negated iJlocutionary force. In particular, 
he claims that the case is very clear in imperatives. He believes that permissive may 
involves negating the force sign in imperatives. For him, if the force sign in a negative 
imperative is negated, the corresponding natural language expression is a permission 
sentence with the modal verb may, as represented in (27). The exclamation mark! 
is a sign indicating directive force. 
(27) You may do X = not!(you do not do X) 
However, we do not believe that tws is a valid proposal. The permission sentence 
You may do X is an indicative sentence with a modal verb may. Nothing compels 
us to represent this sentence with a negated directive force sign. We could very well 
represent it with an assertive force sign which takes scope over a permissive modal 
operator. In (28), II is a sign indicating assertive force , and P is the permissive modal 
operator. 
(28) You may do X = IIP(you do X) 
In rarticuIar, the equivalence in (27) crucially depends on the equivalence 
between •.• <$ and P"<$, where P is a permissive modal operator, in analogy to the 
equiValence between .0,<$ and 0,,<$ in modal logic.s 
(29) a. 
b. 
.h<$ =; p •• ¢ 
.0..,<$ = 0 •• <$ 
H this is correct, then the equivalences in (30) should hold as well. 
(30) a. 
b. .!¢ = P..,<$ 
That is, my directing .<$ should be the same as my not permitting ¢, and my not 
directing ,p should be the same as my permitting ....,,p. But this is dubious. Consider 
the interaction in (31). 
(31) a. A: I don't want to leave yet . 
b. B: Ok. Then, don't leave. 
"For explanations of definitions used in modal logic, see Hughes and Cresswell (1996). 11
Han: The Contribution of Mood and Force in the Interpretation of Imper
Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 1999
Chung-hye Han 108 
In this context, the imperative Don't leave uttered by 8 does not mean the same 
as I am not permitting you to leave. Rather, it means somethin~ similar to I am 
permittin.g YOIl to not leave. Furthermore, t he equivalence in (30b) cannot be valid 
either. For example, if I do not order you to leave, this does not mean that I am 
giving you permission to not leave. 
Durnmett's permission sentences involve two instances of negation: one that 
negates the directive force, and another one that negates the propositional content. 
We might then expect an imperative with double negation to generate a permissive 
reading. Dut this does not occur. The imp erative in (32a) is a request to close the 
window and the imperative in (32h) is a request to finish the cake. The permissive 
readings you may close the window and you may finish your cake are not available 
for the imperatives in (32). 
(32) a. 
b. 
Don't not close the window. 
Don't not finish your cake. 
Further, it is well known that an affirmative imperative can express a permission 
depending on the context. Although the imperatives in (33) do not involve any 
negation, they can perfectly well express permissions. 
(33) a. Come in. (as a reply to a kno.cJ< on the door) 
b. A: Can I open the window? 
[3: Sure. Open it. 
We therefore do not believe that permission sentences are natural language expressions 
for negated directive force. Instead, we accept Frege's intuition that force-indicating 
signs cannot be in the scope of negation. 
A question arises at this point as to the scope possibility of other truth-
conditional operators and force-indicating operators. We conclude this subsection 
with a brief discussion on this issue, limiting it for simplicity to the directive-force in-
dicating operator. We believe that the arguments carryover to other force-indicating 
operators. Let us first consider the scope possibilities of the conditional operator and 
the directive force-indicating operator in conditional imperatives, as in (34). 
(34) a. 
b. 
Go inside if it rains. 
If it rains, go inside. 
For (34a), we can say that the entire sentence is a CP and the imperative operator 
which encodes directive force is in Co, and the conditional clause if it rains is an 
adjunct clause that is right adjoined to IP or to VP, as illustrated in (35a) and (35b). 
(35) a. b. 
CP 
~ 
C 
~ 
Imp-Op IF 
~ 
IF CP 
------=-----go inside 
CP 
~ 
C 
~ 
Imp-Op IP 
~ 
VP 
~ 
VP CP 
.....-------... .c:::----., 
go inside if it rains 
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For (34b), we can say that its structure is just like that of (34a), except that t~e Gon-
ditional clause has topicalized to the left periphery of the sentence. The condItIOnal 
clause then reconstructs to its original position for interpretation. This is illustrated 
in (36) . 
(36) a. 
h. 
CP 
~ 
CP C 
-------==----- ~ If it rains; /" ""-.. 
Imp-Op IP 
~ 
IP CP 
....--:::-=---. I 
go inside t ; 
CP 
~ 
CP C 
~ ~ 
1 rams; Imp-Op IP 
~ 
VP 
~ 
VP CP 
....--:::-=---. I 
go inside t; 
Thus, imperative operator scopes over the entire sentence in both of the conditional 
imperatives in (34). 
Other truth-conditional operators that require attention are and and or. In 
natural language, these operators can coordinate entire sentences (as in (37)) as well 
as subconstituents of a sentence (as in (38)) . 
(37) a. Eat an apple or eat an orange. 
b. Have dinner and watch a movie. 
(38) a. Eat an apple or an orange. 
b. Buy beer and wine. 
The sentences in (38) are examples of NP coordination. For these sentences, we can 
just say that the entire sentence is a CP with the imperative operator in Co. And 
so the imperative operator has scope over the entire sentence. But we cannot say 
the same thing for the examples in (37). In (37), two imperatives are coordinated 
in each example. The verbs in each conjunct are in the imperative form. In effect, 
in (37), and and or have scope over two imperatives. Given this fact, we restrict 
the truth-conditional operators that cannot scope over iIlocutionary-force operators 
to negation and the conditional operator. 
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5.5. Speaker's Belief in the Realization of the Situation Described by 
the Proposition 
The speaker of an imperative believes that the state of affairs described by the 
proposition it expr.·· ses is realizable. Hence, it is infelicitous to follow an imperative 
with a sentence that expresses the speaker's belief that the situation described by the 
proposition of the imperative will not be realized. 
. (39) # Eat this fish! But you won't. 
Moreover, imperatives with individual-level stative predicates are infelicitous because 
the states of affairs described by individual-level statives are not something that can 
be realized unless they have already been reali:zed.6 
(40) a. # Be tall. 
b. # Have blue eyes. 
This property is captured by our proposal that the directive force entails the infor-
mation that the speaker believes that the addressee hils the ability to bring about the 
state of affairs described. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have proposed a way of interpreting imperatives. We have 
argued that the logical form of imperatives includes two components: one that en-
codes directive illocutionary force and another that encodes the irrealis modality that 
contributes the information that the situation described by the imperative is unreal-
ized. We defined the component that encodes directive force as a function that takes 
a proposition that denotes a set of hypothetical possible worlds and turns it into a 
directive action. We defined a directive action in turn as an instruction to the hearer 
to update a plan set with a proposition. According to our analysis, the directive force 
of imperatives is not the result of Gricean inference, but is directly encoded in their 
logical forms, and Gricean inference plays a role only in explaining the variability of 
directive force of imperatives. 
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